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A Modest Proposal on Supreme Court Unanimity to
Constitutionally Invalidate Laws
Dwight G. Duncan*
fK == f kqolar`qflk =
There is a problem in our constitutional history: the problem of
split U.S. Supreme Court decisions invalidating democratically enacted laws. From Dred Scott1 to Lochner2 to Roe v. Wade3 to Citizens
United,4 and even the recent Second Amendment decisions of Heller5
and McDonald,6 these patently fallible decisions on controversial political and social issues have divided the nation, politicized the Court,
poisoned the U.S. Supreme Court nomination process, and thwarted
the balance of power created by the three branches of government
which maintains democracy. Because of these consequences, this paper
proposes requiring U.S. Supreme Court unanimity to overturn legislation on constitutional grounds, an alternative which is morally and
politically desirable. I leave for another occasion the legal and practical
questions of how to implement such a unanimity requirement.
While the audacity of this idea is perhaps remarkable, flying as it
does in the face of our unbroken history of U.S. Supreme Court cases
decided by majority vote of the Justices, I would ask the readers’ indulgence or suspension of disbelief for long enough to at least consider
the argument.
Before expounding on the subject of this article, however, I think
it important to share some personal background and beliefs. I have

* Dwight G. Duncan is a professor at the University of Massachusetts School of Law in
Dartmouth, MA. I wish to gratefully acknowledge the help I have received on this article from
various colleagues and friends, starting with our Dean Eric Mitnick, Professor Richard PeltzSteele, and ace editor Ethan Dazelle. More recently, my good friend Edward Boyer has helped
with the editing and ideas, and my law students David Melanson and Christopher Leazott have
helped with the footnotes.
1. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
2. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
3. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
5. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
6. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
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taught, or tried to teach, Constitutional Law for over a quarter century. By Constitutional Law I mean U.S. Supreme Court case-law purporting to interpret the U.S. Constitution. This can be a challenge,
partly because familiarity can breed contempt, or at least a kind of
jaundice. I must admit I have become more cynical about a subject
where the U.S. Constitution means just what a majority of nine appointed lawyers say it means, for better or worse, regardless of what
the text actually says and originally meant. After all, the Justices interpret the U.S. Constitution through lenses colored by their own personalities and political perspectives. So do we all, of course.
But I also have been frustrated by the U.S. Supreme Court’s questionable basis for deciding constitutional issues like abortion and gay
marriage. The effect is to remove these contentious issues from the
political process and make them unamenable to democratic compromise by deciding them as a matter of constitutional right in which the
prevailing side takes all. Likewise, objections could easily be raised to
the questionable invalidation, on constitutional grounds, of gun control laws7 and campaign finance regulation8—also decided by split vote,
even by 5-4 vote of the U.S. Supreme Court. Count me as skeptical of
rule by judge.
Moreover, I find constitutional expectations to be unreasonable at
times. Parties to cases, and even the general public, somehow expect
the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve all the issues presented to the
Court, and ultimately all the issues of the day, regardless of whether
the U.S. Constitution and the laws actually address those issues. And
so, the Justices can dragoon the Constitution, by hook or by crook, in
the event no ordinary legal basis is at hand, to resolve cases before
them. As the Pulitzer-Prize winning musical Of Thee I Sing noted in
song in the early 1930s,9 “On that matter no one budges, for all cases
of the sort are decided by the Judges of the Supreme Court.”10
The text of the U.S. Constitution, though, cannot be shoehorned
into being made capable of resolving every case. To the extent that the

7. Heller, 554 U.S. at 570.
8. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310.
9. The 1932 Pulitzer Prize Winner in Drama, THE PULITZER PRIZES, http://www.pulitzer.org/winners/george-s-kaufman-morrie-ryskind-and-ira-gershwin (last visited Nov. 3,
2018).
10. GEORGE GERSHWIN & IRA GERSHWIN, TRUMPETER BLOW YOUR HORN, in Of
Thee I Sing, (1931) (it sounds better if Ira Gershwin’s lyrics are sung to the music of George
Gershwin, of course).
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U.S. Constitution does not decide the question at hand, freedom prevails, or should prevail. One might even cite the religious maxim, “in
necessariis unitas, in dubiis libertas, in omnibus caritas”— “unity in
necessary things, freedom in doubtful ones and love in everything,”11—
but applying it to constitutional interpretation.

ffK == ` lkpqfqrqflk^i= f ks^ifa^qflk=
My concern is solely with U.S. Supreme Court split or non-unanimous decisions that purport to invalidate laws, regulations, decrees,
or government practices—whether legislative, executive, or judicial in
character—on the grounds that the said rules or practices—whether
national, state, or local in scope—violate the U.S. Constitution. Cases
decided on the basis of federal laws and regulations, or for that matter
state laws or regulations, in contrast, do not generate the same concerns. For these purely statutory or regulatory cases can always be reversed in the ordinary course by new laws passed by Congress, state
legislatures, new executive orders, or regulations formulated by the executive or administrative agencies, whether federal or state. So, if the
U.S. Supreme Court makes mistakes in deciding such matters, the mistakes can be corrected fairly simply through representative government and the democratic process.
But where unelected Justices invalidate contested laws as a matter
of constitutional right, and they get it wrong, they remove effective
sovereignty from the people; for there is no reasonably practical way
to undo the harm. The ruling is the practical final word, unappealable
to, and unamendable by, the political branches. Apart from the U.S.
Supreme Court eventually overruling itself, such as when it overturned
Lochner v. New York in the 1930s (allowing the regulation of working
hours, in spite of Lochner’s ruling that freedom of contract prevented
such regulation),12 there is no democratic recourse short of attempting
to amend the U.S. Constitution or to impeach the offending Justices.
And such recourse is rarely possible and never successful in the case of
impeachment of U.S. Supreme Court Justices.
Now that I have clarified what I am and am not writing about, let
us narrow in on the assertion that unanimity is both morally and politically desirable. The U.S. Constitution begins with the words “[w]e

11. MARCO ANTONIO DE DOMINIS, DE REPUBLICA ECCLISIASTICA 676 (1617).
12. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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the people,” and the theory is that sovereignty ultimately comes from
the people13: government “of the people, by the people, [and] for the
people,” in the immortal words of Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address.14
However, if the Court can invalidate laws and regulations enacted by
the political branches through the democratic process on the grounds
that they violate the Constitution, even when it is just on the say-so of
a bare majority of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, decisions are rendered
morally suspect. This exercise of judicial review is undemocratic, unless the majority rule is based on a constituency of nine.
This feature of judicial review is a central paradox because this tugof-war between people and elites over what rules should govern them
and who gets to decide is at the heart of our political and legal history,
from civil war to civil rights, to culture wars, to political correctness.
In other words, non-unanimous constitutional decisions short-circuit
the political and legislative processes. Where legislation is overturned
on a split 5-4 vote, the problem is magnified. It means that the constitutional issue has been settled by the swing vote, usually Justice Kennedy in recent history.15 This gives new meaning to the principle of
“one person, one vote,”16 meaning that the individual with the swing
vote is the only vote that ultimately counts.
The Massachusetts Constitution says that a government should
be one of laws and not of men.17 But 5-4 splits mean that our government is palpably one of men (or women, since Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor was also the swing vote in her day)18 and decidedly not the
rule of law. If a constitutional interpretation is truly correct as a legal matter, as opposed to a political matter, then it should be able to
convince the entirety of the Court, irrespective of political affiliation.
Constitutional decisions that are less than unanimous reflect
merely political choices.
A related problem with non-unanimous and thus non-authoritative U.S. Supreme Court decisions invalidating legislation is, as
touched upon earlier, the practical difficulty of overturning them. This
is because, under Article V, repeated supermajorities are necessary to
amend the U.S. Constitution (two-thirds of both houses of Congress

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
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U.S. CONST. pmbl.
Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863).
See e.g. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964).
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 30.
See e.g. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
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and three-quarters of the states, apart from the never-employed stateinitiated convention route).19 Amendments have only happened a
handful of times in our history.20 This recourse is virtually impossible
for any socially controversial issues, which are often the subject of the
most divisive and invidious U.S. Supreme Court decisions. And while
impeachment of sitting U.S. Supreme Court Justices has been attempted several times in our history, none have actually succeeded.21
So the threat of impeachment is a paper tiger at most.
Now, if the U.S. Supreme Court makes a mistake in interpreting
the U.S. Constitution to invalidate laws, significant time amounting to
decades, or even a Civil War, must intervene. For example, it took the
ratification of the Thirteenth22 and Fourteenth Amendments23 to overturn the notorious 1857 Dred Scott decision.24 In contrast, the requirement of unanimity would assure that the Court’s reading of the U.S.
Constitution was truly unimpeachable and authoritative. It would also
depoliticize the current bitterly partisan judicial nomination and confirmation process of presidential appointments to the U.S. Supreme
Court;25 and for these reasons it would be both morally and politically
desirable. The country is currently very divided and polarized. The
U.S. Constitution, as our fundamental law, should be a force that
unites Americans and inculcates respect for law. Split constitutional
decisions which invalidate democratically enacted laws instead divide
the American people.

fffK == t e^q= t lria= e ^mmbk= f c=^= o rib=lc= r k^kfjfqv= t bob=
^ almqba \=
In reviewing judicial history, I will consider unanimous U.S. Supreme Court decisions separate and apart from 5-4 cases and other

19. U.S. CONST. art. V.
20. Additional Amendments of the Constitution, BILL OF RIGHTS INSTITUTE,
https://www.billofrightsinstitute.org/founding-documents/additional-amendments/ (last visited
Nov. 3, 2018).
21. Senate Prepares for Impeachment Trial, UNITED STATES SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Senate_Tries_Justice.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2018).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
23. Id.
24. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
25. The Editorial Board, Opinion, The Supreme Court as Partisan Tool, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/04/opinion/the-supreme-court-as-partisantool.html?mcubz=0.
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cases marked by dissent. This is because unanimous cases have unimpeachable authority. For example, the landmark case of Brown v.
Board of Education, is viewed as one of the most authoritative U.S.
Supreme Court decisions, in part because it was unanimously decided.
It also declared segregation in public schools to be a violation of equal
protection of the laws;26 as did its companion case of Bolling v.
Sharpe,27 for schools in the District of Columbia. Brown is the gold
standard for good constitutional decision-making by the Court, and
Chief Justice Warren was appropriately careful to work to ensure its unanimity.
Another example of unanimous constitutional decision-making invalidating laws is Marbury v. Madison,28 which established the principle of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation and, in the
process, invalidated section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.29 These
cases, while not technically infallible, are considered to be definitive,
even if they were not originally, and widely accepted throughout our
history as truly authoritative. The same note of unimpeachable authority extends also to the unanimous decision in McCulloch v. Maryland30
defining the reach of the “necessary and proper clause”31 of Article 1,
Section 8 and the consequent unconstitutionality of Maryland’s attempt to tax the Second Bank of the United States.32

fsK == qeb= e loolo I =qeb= e loolo =
Split decisions are obviously more problematic. On a number of
occasions, the original minority view, with the passage of significant
time, became the eventual majority view.33 We can start with Dred
Scott and add Lochner for good measure.34
Dred Scott v. Sandford decided that African Americans were not
citizens and could not sue in federal court.35 Furthermore, it held that

26. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
27. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
28. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
29. Id. at 178.
30. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
31. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
32. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 436–37.
33. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
624–31 (1919).
34. The academic consensus on those cases is unanimous, or virtually so.
35. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404.
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the right of slaveholding was protected by substantive due process of
the Fifth Amendment (thus making it the first substantive due process
case),36 and that therefore the Missouri Compromise of 1820 (which
outlawed slavery in federal territories north of a certain latitude) was
unconstitutional.37 This decision was only the second time the U.S.
Supreme Court had constitutionally invalidated a law passed by Congress. It provoked the American Civil War.38 It took the war and both
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution
to undo the damage that the Dred Scott decision had done. But the
decision was not unanimous, as it occasioned two dissents by Justices
Mclean and Curtis, to their everlasting credit.39 Had we only recognized as authoritative constitutional decisions that are unanimous in
invalidating laws or regulations, Dred Scott would not have had this
horrific effect because it was not unanimous. And the debate over slavery would have remained in the political branches.
Lochner v. New York, decided in 1905, decided that maximum
hour legislation for bakers was unconstitutional because such legislation violated freedom of contract,40 a liberty substantively protected
from state interference by the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.41 It took thirty years for this economic era of substantive
due process to be overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court,42 and in the
meanwhile, the Lochner precedent prevented the enactment and enforcement of progressive social legislation for the workplace.43

36. Id. at 450.
37. Id.
38. History.com Editors, Dred Scott Decision, History.COM (Oct. 27, 2009), http://ww
w.history.com/topics/black-history/dred-scott-case.
39. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 529 (7-2 decision) (McLean, J., Curtis, J., dissenting).
40. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64–65 (1905).
41. Id. at 52.
42. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
43. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 65. Lochner was decided 5-4 and featured a famous dissent by
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes where he stated that our Constitution does not enshrine any
particular economic theory, like laissez-faire.
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Indeed, virtually all the substantive due process cases invalidating
legislation—starting with Dred Scott44 and proceeding through Lochner,45 Meyer v. Nebraska,46 Griswold v. Connecticut,47 Roe v. Wade48
and Obergefell v. Hodges49—were split decisions and thus non-authoritative in my view and would have vanished if unanimity were required. The only substantive due process case that was unanimous
and would stand was the 1925 case Pierce v. Society of Sisters to be
discussed below.

sK == qeb= d lla= ` ^pbp= a b`faba= r k^kfjlrpiv =
Leading the parade of great unanimous constitutional decisions
that invalidated legislation is, as I have noted, Brown v. Board of Education.50 The holding of that case, was enforced unanimously in
Cooper v. Aaron, which rejected, “a claim by the Governor and Legislature of a state that there is no duty on state officials to obey federal
court orders resting on this Court’s considered interpretation of the
United States Constitution.”51 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, another
great unanimous decision, ruled that a statutory state monopoly on education violated the substantive due process rights of parents to direct
the upbringing and education of their children.52 Also in line with these
cases is the 1960s case of New York Times v. Sullivan, which said that
freedom of speech and of the press under the First Amendment, as
applied to states via the Fourteenth Amendment,53 entailed a higher
standard of proof before libel damages could be recovered by public
officials,54 regardless of state law which established a lower standard
of proof.55

44. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 393.
45. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45.
46. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (invalidating law restricting foreignlanguage teaching).
47. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
48. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
49. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
50. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
51. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
52. Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534–
35 (1925).
53. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
54. Id. at 279–80.
55. Id. at 283–84.
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One could argue with the textual basis in the U.S. Constitution for
unanimous decisions, of course, but the fact that they were unanimous
and widely accepted in practice makes them authoritative nonetheless.
For example, in the freedom of religion area, the Court recently and
unanimously decided that both the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment required a ministerial exemption from employment discrimination laws, so that churches rather
than government would ultimately decide who authorized teachers of
their religion.56
Gideon v. Wainwright, a unanimous 1963 decision, extended the
right to counsel to state proceedings and ruled that the government
had to pay for legal representation for indigents in criminal proceeding.57 There was also the Court’s unanimous decision in Loving v. Virginia in 1967 that bans on interracial marriage violated the Equal Protection Clause.58 Or Shelley v. Kraemer from 1948, invalidating the
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.59
Another unanimous constitutional decision striking down the application of a state law would be Hurley v. Irish–American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, wherein the U.S. Supreme Court
unanimously decided in 1995 that the application of state public accommodation law to a parade violated the private parade organizer’s
freedom of speech and expressive association.60 These unanimous decisions have stood the test of time and have been accepted both morally
and politically.

sfK == qeb= _^a= p mifq= a b`fpflkp=
In contrast, however, the controversial non-unanimous decisions
like Roe v. Wade61 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey62—the abortion
56. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity
Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171, 188– 89 (2012).
57. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963).
58. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
59. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1948).
60. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 581 (1995).
This case is a personal favorite because I wrote the briefs for petitioner Wacko Hurley in the
case. Under my suggested approach of recognizing only unanimous constitutional decisions invalidating laws as authoritative, all these previously mentioned judgments invalidating laws or
their application would stand.
61. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
62. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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cases—and U.S. v. Windsor63 and Obergefell v. Hodges64—the gay
marriage cases—would not stand as authoritative. The effect would be
to return these divisive subjects to the political arena, where compromise could be reached, rather than an all-or-nothing judicial approach
based on the inflexible rights-based assertion of individuals.
While some social conservatives might argue, “that’s all well and
good for social conservatives like you,” they should not lose sight of
the fact that the recent controversial 5-4 decisions of Citizens
United—invalidating campaign finance regulations under the First
Amendment as applied to corporations65—and the Heller66 and
McDonald67 decisions—invalidating gun control legislation under the
Second Amendment—would also be non-operative because they are
non-unanimous. Indeed, the split Court decisions invalidating affirmative action plans,68 or invalidating some of the Voting Rights Act extension,69 would also fail.
Of course, this modest proposal is not without a few hiccups,
bumps, and limits. It would, for example, rob certain constitutional
cases of their precedential value, since they were split decisions. And
so, the dormant commerce clause cases, which establish the principle
that states may neither discriminate against out-of-state commerce,
nor excessively burden interstate commerce, if the burden clearly exceeds the putative local benefit,70 would no longer hold sway. Similarly,
cases like Miranda v. Arizona,71 that have become fairly settled features
of our legal landscape, would no longer control if my proposal was applied retroactively. But if such rules like the Miranda rights are a good
idea—and time has indeed demonstrated their wisdom—then there
would be no problem with legislatively and democratically enacting
them. Admittedly, these split constitutional decisions changed the political dynamic. But it seems important that ultimate responsibility for
constitutional social change rests with the elected, democratically re-

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
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United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010).
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No.1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 29 (2013).
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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sponsible branches. The same might be said of gay marriage or permissive abortion laws, if that is what the political reality is—as opposed
to a judicially mandated fiat supposedly grounded in the
U.S. Constitution.
Indeed, the enactment of laws from split Court decisions would
represent a solemn democratic ratification of the wisdom of the U.S.
Supreme Court; as happened, for example, when the Civil Rights Act
of 196472 effectively ratified and extended the U.S. Supreme Court’s
unanimous 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education.73 Such cases
have become constitutional bedrock. It would be inconceivable for
these to disappear now that the source of sovereignty, the people, so
ardently demand such things from their government.
Some legislators rather like having controversial issues (e.g., gun
rights, abortion rights, gay marriage rights, and freedom from campaign finance limitations) be decided by the courts, because then they
do not have to take a stand pro or con and can claim that this matter is
out of their hands and rests with the courts. But, allowing the shirking
of personal responsibility by politicians and passing the buck to the
courts is not an acceptable form of representative democracy. Indeed,
resting ultimate responsibility for our laws with the political branches
as opposed to the courts may help cure legislative dysfunction.

sffK == ^ = ` ^pb=ql=qeb=` lkqo^ov =
One split constitutional decision that was of enormous importance
and precedential value is Baker v. Carr,74—the Warren Court decision
from the 1960s that subjected the apportionment of legislatures to judicial review under the Equal Protection Clause. In so doing, it reversed a longstanding holding that apportionment was a political question and thus not justiciable by the courts. The case involved vigorous
dissents from Justices Frankfurter and Harlan. In overturning the
egregiously disparate state legislative districts in Tennessee, the decision rectified an obvious unfairness—departure from the equal principle of “one person, one vote.”
Following a rule of unanimity to invalidate the practice on
that constitutional basis, however, would mean there would be no such

72. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
73. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
74. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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result. Is that really defensible? How can a non-representative legislature be expected to reform itself in the direction of more equal representation? The rule of constitutional unanimity would not be cost-free.
Under this proposal the U.S. Supreme Court would have to wait
until the judgment of unconstitutionality became unanimous. I suspect
that would not be difficult nowadays after the path-breaking precedent
of Baker v. Carr. But one of the progeny of U.S. Supreme Court oversight of equal voter strength was Bush v. Gore,75—a split decision on
constitutional grounds that rightly lives in judicial infamy. To have the
2000 election be resolved by the political branches, and not by the
Court, would be a historical bonus.76
As suggested above, there is a practical issue that needs to be addressed: would such a rule of constitutional unanimity to invalidate
laws be applied retroactively? Since the reason for such a rule is based
on the bloopers of history, the whole point of the proposal is to clear
up the mess retroactively and not just going-forward. The answer to
this would depend upon how many people are tired of leaving lifechanging issues in the hands of one appointed judge. But, as a practical
matter, the Court could simply refuse to follow such non-unanimous
precedent in future cases.

sfffK == q eb= i fjfqp=lc= j v= m olmlp^i =
This proposal would not solve all the problems of U.S. Supreme
Court history, like those posed by cases that did not invalidate laws on
constitutional grounds. For example, the Korematsu case, since it validated the Japanese exclusion order of the executive branch by a split
vote, but did not invalidate it, would still stand.77 So would Buck v.
Bell, the notorious 1927 decision over Justice Butler’s dissent upholding Virginia’s compulsory sterilization law.78 Indeed, the problem of
Plessy v. Ferguson,79 the decision from the 1890’s which upheld segregation in railroad cars,80 would be untouched by this proposed rule
requiring unanimity to constitutionally invalidate laws. Neither would

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

12

Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
The fact that it would annoy the parties is just a perk.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Id. at 551.
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the rule affect the split ruling in the controversial Kelo81 decision involving the U.S. Supreme Court upholding a dubious exercise of the
power of eminent domain.82
Since these problematic regulations originated with the political
branches, they could have been corrected by the political branches; for
the U.S. Supreme Court was not the final word on these matters. The
political reaction to the Kelo decision is instructive, as a number of
states and municipalities amended their eminent domain laws to require a more specific public use rather than a catch-all public purpose,
which Kelo’s majority allowed for.83
Finally, there is also a possible problem with the unanimity approach: conditioning the Court’s ultimate power of invalidation on
constitutional unanimity allows for a hold-out Justice to make unreasonable demands in return for his or her vote. This could lead to a kind
of stalemate or paralysis of the Court, the inability to achieve unanimity. We could be trading one problem for another, as in the devil you
know being better than the devil you do not. But the cost of this would
merely empower the political process to resolve the issue, as a practical
matter. What would be so bad about that? Further, if a Justice holds
out, frequently alone, then it could motivate a political outcry, giving
bite to the paper tiger of impeachment or conceivably motivate a constitutional amendment.
Obviously, this modest proposal could not solve all the problems
of U.S. Supreme Court history and it may not be practicable as a rule
of decision-making by the U.S. Supreme Court. However, where the
stakes are often so high and such serious implications may result from
a decision, I urge the reader not to simply dismiss it as an academic
exercise meant for the classroom. Recall again the horrifying consequences of assertions made by the majority in the Dred Scott case:
620,000 dead, the toll of the Civil War.84 And while such a war is now
inconceivable, the bad blood stirred and stewing in an already divisive
and volatile political climate as a result of such decisions is a consequence a civil society could well do without.
The Court’s greatest decisions have been unanimous ones and its
lousiest decisions, the bloopers of constitutional history, have
81. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
82. Id. at 484.
83. Dana Berliner, Looking Back Ten Years After Kelo, 125 YALE L.J.F. 82 (2015).
84. Drew Gilpin Faust, Death and Dying, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/nr/
travel/national_cemeteries/death.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2018).
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largely been split decisions. Contrast those split decisions invalidating
laws on constitutional grounds with the huge success of Brown v.
Board of Education85 where the Court spoke unanimously and authoritatively and eventually succeeded in convincing the country of the
rightness of its decision, as evidenced, for example, by the eventual enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.86 Unanimity should be considered a stand-in for unquestioned authority.
Moreover, to empty split decisions of constitutional force
will merely mean that the political branches will be able to deal with
the controversial subjects. This will make our republican polity
more democratic and our legislators more accountable to the people.
It will also favor practical compromises over ideological impasse. As
one of my heroes Alfred E. Smith, Governor of New York during the
1920’s used to say, “The only cure for the evils of democracy is
more democracy.”87

85. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
86. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
87. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MODERN QUOTATIONS 296 (Elizabeth Knowles ed., Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed. 2007).
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